Three classifications of signals are discussed. The first is based on the type of information that they convey. A 'self-reporting signal' provides information about some property of the signaller, while an 'other-reporting signal' conveys information about an object or organism other than the signaller. The second classification is based on the processes that maintain the reliability of the signal. A 'minimal signal' is one whose cost is no greater than that needed to transmit the information effectively; such signals can only be reliable if signaller and receiver place the possible outcomes of the interaction in the same rank order. A 'cost-added signal' is a signal whose cost is greater than that required to transmit the information. The intensity of the signal is correlated with some quality of interest to the receiver. This correlation exists because, in the past, receivers have responded differently to signals of different intensity. An 'index' is a signal in which there is, again, a correlation between intensity of signal and quality, but one which does not depend on past coevolution, but on physical necessity. For example, if size is correlated with fighting ability, a signal conveying information about size is an index; in species in which the male feeds the young, courtship feeding is an index of his ability to do so. Since in both cost-added signals and indices, there is a correlation between signal intensity and some relevant quality of the signaller, both are examples of evaluation signals; this term can be used when the mechanism responsible for the correlation is uncertain. A third classification of signals is based upon the relationship between their form and that of the object being signalled about. A 'symbol' is arbitrarily linked with its object, an 'icon' resembles its object and an 'index' is physically related to its object. It seems unlikely that many, if any, biological signals are symbols.
Introduction
A signal is often defined as an action or structure which increases the fitness of an individual by altering the behaviour of other organisms (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Hasson, 1994) . In common usage, however, the term 'signal' implies that information is being transmitted [we mean information in the colloquial, rather than technical, sense; see Dawkins (1995) ]. In this paper, we are mostly concerned with the information aspect and, in particular, the evolutionary processes that ensure that the information is reliable. It is therefore important to understand the connection between the definitions based, respectively, on altering the behaviour of other individuals and on conveying information. Essentially, there is a connection because it is not evolutionarily stable for the receiver to alter its behaviour unless, on average, the signal carries information of value to it. The fitness of the receiver need not be increased on every occasion that it responds to a signal. For example, bolas spiders (Mastophora sp.) emit a pheromone which lures male armyworm moths (Spodoptera frugiperda) to within capture range (Eberhard, 1977) . Male moths respond to the spider's signal because they cannot differentiate between it and that emitted by female moths and because, on average, they benefit from approaching the pheromone. There might even be cases in which receivers are harmed by their response to a signal. These would arise because receivers were lagging behind signallers in an evolutionary arms race and their response, which is not an ESS, would be short-lived in evolutionary time. We therefore expect most animal signals to benefit both signaller and receiver on average; in other words the receiver gains information from the signal (see Section 2). The central problem in explaining the evolution of most animal signals then is: what guarantees that the signal reliably reflects the state of the signaller (or, for some signals, the state of the world)? Equivalently, why are signalling systems not destroyed by cheating? In this respect, animals and humans have much in common. Defining the study of human communication, Eco (1976) wrote 'semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything that can be used in order to lie '. Zahavi (1975 '. Zahavi ( , 1977 suggested that reliable signals must be costly, because only high-quality individuals can afford the cost. Although some authors (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1976) doubted whether the idea could work, there are now several formal models showing that it can be evolutionarily stable for only high-quality individuals, or for individuals whose need is great, to give a costly signal (Grafen, 1990; Johnstone & Grafen, 1992; Maynard Smith, 1991 . Earlier, Enquist (1985) had shown that it can be stable for only those individuals whose need is great to give risky signals. We will refer to such signals as ''cost-added signals'', rather than calling them ''handicaps'' (Zahavi, 1975) . This is to avoid using the same word for a phenomenon and a particular explanation of it. Two areas of potential confusion remain.
(i) Evolutionarily stable reliable signals need not be cost-added signals. Two other processes can also lead to reliable signalling. First, there may be an unavoidable physical connection between the intensity of a signal and quality (Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976) . Second, the signaller and receiver may place the possible outcomes of the interaction in the same rank order as far as fitness is concerned; in such cases, cost-free signals can be evolutionarity stable (Maynard Smith, 1994) .
(ii) What is meant by ''cost''? All signals must cost something if they are unambiguously to convey the necessary information, but this is not what Zahavi meant by ''costly''. In Section 2 we distinguish between ''efficacy costs'' and ''strategic costs''. This paper tries to clarify these and other confusions, and suggests a terminology that will help to avoid them in the future. Section 2 defines signal, information and cost. Section 3 distinguishes between self-reporting and other-reporting signals. In both these sections, we follow closely a recent paper by Hasson (1994) . Section 4 attempts a classification of the main models of reliable signalling, and suggest the terms minimal signal, cost-added signal, and index. Finally, Section 5 discusses the specific forms of signals. Zahavi (1993) argues that the ''handicap principle creates a logical connection between the detailed pattern of a signal and the message encoded in it''. There are, however, other reasons for expecting such a correlation to exist.
First, there is a methodological point to be made. It is better to define terms in relation to models, and the assumptions of those models, and not in relation to real examples. For example, what kind of signal is the roaring of red deer Cervus elephas? It depends. Maybe any stag could roar rapidly and loudly, but a low-quality stag cannot afford to: if so, the signal is a cost-added signal according to the usage suggested below. Or maybe only high-quality stags can roar rapidly: if so, the signal is an index (see below). If we define our terms in relation to real cases, we shall not know whether we are arguing about the meaning of a term, or the nature of the world. Of course, not any model will do: it must be clearly formulated, and must predict the evolution of at least some essential features of the real world. Finally, if we define terms in relation to models, we may invent a term to describe a type of signal which in practice rarely or never happens. For example, Zahavi might argue that what we define below as minimal signals do not happen in animals. We would not agree. Even if such signals do not happen we still need the term, if only to say ''animals never use minimal signals''.
Definitions: signals, information and costs
As mentioned above, Hasson (1994) follows Krebs & Dawkins (1984) by defining a signal as an action or structure which increases the fitness of an individual by altering the behaviour of other organisms. He also suggests that a signal must reduce fitness in contexts other than interactions with other organisms. He introduces this additional proviso for the following reason. A prey individual that runs fast may alter the behaviour of a predator: for example, the latter may abandon the chase sooner. But we would not wish to call running fast a signal because, in Hasson's words, ''its main specific benefit is derived from improved efficiency''. The proviso that a signal be costly outside the interaction does not avoid this difficulty. For example, merely being large may alter the behaviour of opponents in contests, and may well be costly in other contexts, but we would not wish to classify large size as a signal, although structures that emphasize size, such as manes and ruffs, are certainly signals. There seems no alternative, therefore, to including in the definition the notion that a signal has features specifically adapted to alter the behaviour of others. We therefore define a signal as an action or structure that increases the fitness of an individual by altering the behaviour of other organisms detecting it, and that has characteristics that have evolved because they have that effect.
The signal alters the information available to the receiver. The change in information may be positive, in which case the fitness of the receiver is increased by receiving the signal, or it may be negative, so that the fitness of the receiver is reduced. Examples of signals that reduce the information available to the receiver include the eyespots of butterflies, the colours of Batesian mimics, the lures of anglerfish, and camouflage generally. Hasson (1994) argues that the advantage of defining information in terms of the change in fitness of the receiver is that it brings the phenomena of mimicry and camouflage under the umbrella of signalling theory. Admittedly, it seems odd to regard a perfectly camouflaged prey animal that is not perceived by the predator as sending a signal. But the camouflage is an evolved adaptation which changes an animal that once did not signal to one that signals ''I am a leaf, or other piece of background, and not edible''. If we do not treat camouflage as a signal, we are faced with some hard distinctions. Where do we draw the line between warning coloration (obviously a signal), and camouflage? Is a caterpillar that looks like a turd, or an orchid flower that looks like an insect, sending a signal?
Cost is equivalent to reduction in fitness. A signal may be costly for one of two reasons.
(i) Efficacy cost: that is, the cost needed to convey the information unambiguously (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991; Endler, 1993) . A road sign directing traffic must be large and expensive if it is on a motorway, and must be readable from cars travelling fast, but can be relatively cheap on a side road.
(ii) Strategic cost: Zahavi's (1975 Zahavi's ( , 1977 idea of a handicap is of a signal that is more expensive than is required merely to convey the information: the additional cost has evolved because it has ensured that the signal is honest.
As an example, consider the tail of a peacock, Pavo cristatus. According to Zahavi, the tail is costly because only by being so can it be a reliable indicator of quality-an argument that was formalized by Grafen (1990) . If there was no problem of honesty, the cost could be much less. Thus suppose that females can perceive, say, ten levels of quality by examining the tails of males. If efficacy was the only problem, the information could reliably be conveyed by a row of white spots on the wing, varying in number from one to ten. The information is not encoded in this way, not for reasons of efficacy, but because, if high quality could be signalled so cheaply, there would be no defence against cheating.
Strategic costs may be incurred in the course of an interaction, or independently of it (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991) . In Enquist's (1985) model of risky signals, the cost is paid during the interaction, as in the case of threat displays of fulmars, Fulmaris glacialis (Enquist et al., 1985) . By contrast, in Grafen's model (1990) the cost is independent of the interaction, as in the case of a peacock's tail. In both models the signal is a cost-added signal, in the sense that its reliability depends on its cost.
Self-reporting Signals, Other-reporting Signals and Cues
Hasson (1993) distinguishes between what we will call self-reporting signals, other-reporting signals, and cues: as explained below, he uses different terms for the first two categories. Self-reporting signals provide information, positive or negative, about some property of the signaller. Examples include sexual displays by males, begging by offspring, and warning coloration by distasteful prey. An other-reporting signal conveys information about an object or organism other than the signaller. Examples include alarm calls and the dances of honey bees, Apis mellifera. Finally, a cue is a feature of the external world used to decide what to do. In general, a cue is not a signal: for example it may be an inanimate object, such as a landmark. If, however, a cue is a property of an organism, it may evolve into a signal.
Hasson (1994) calls self-reporting and otherreporting signals ''choice-based'' and ''cooperative'' signals, respectively. We find these terms confusing. Self-reporting systems can lead to cooperative outcomes. For example, the Philip Sidney game (Maynard Smith, 1991) describes a self-reporting signal (the ''soldier'' signals that he is thirsty), but can lead to a cooperative result, with cost-free signals. Similarly, other-reporting signals need not lead to cooperation. For example, two species of flycatching birds, a shrike-tanager and an antshrike, give alarm calls in order to drive other passerines from a food source (Munn, 1986) . For these reasons, although we accept Hasson's distinction, we have introduced different terms. Grafen (1990) makes a similar distinction between ''persuasive'' and ''informative'' signals. We also find these terms confusing. Self-reporting signals need not involve persuasion: many contact cells may simply indicate the position of the signaller. All signals, not just other-reporting ones, can be viewed as informative, even if they lower the fitness of the receiver (Hasson, 1994; Section 2).
A Classification of Signals According to
Evolutionary Mechanism Table 1 suggests a classification of signals according to the mechanism ensuring reliability.
(i) A minimal signal is one whose cost is as low as it can be while conveying the necessary information. Reliability does not require the signal to be more costly than is required to transmit the information. Instead, reliability is guaranteed because signaller and receiver put the possible outcomes of the interaction in the same rank order, determined by their effects on fitness. Theoretical analyses (Maynard Smith, 1991 Johnstone & Grafen, 1992) show that minimal signals can be evolutionarily stable if the possible states of the signaller are either discrete, or at least bimodally distributed, but not if they are unimodally distributed. There is room for argument about how common such signals will turn out to be. Many signals between mated pairs may belong in this category. For example, the vocal repertoires of many birds include a wide variety of calls given by paired individuals that are inaudible to humans at ranges of more than a few metres (Cramp, 1988) . A rather different example is the courtship inhibiting signal given by mated female Drosophila subobscura (Maynard Smith, 1956) . In this species, females usually mate only once. A mated female will bend her abdomen towards a courting male, and extrude her ovipositor, a signal that often stops courtship. This is a candidate for a cost-free signal, because there is no conflict of interest between male and female: the male only wastes his time by continuing to court. In the light of the theoretical analysis, it is relevant that a female can be in only one of two discrete states, mated or virgin. Another case in which both parties would agree about the outcome of an interaction is the suggestion that prey signal to predators, saying ''I have seen you, it is to both our advantages for you not to waste your time and let me continue feeding (or whatever)''.
(ii) A cost-added signal is a signal that is more costly to make than the minimum required to transmit the information. The excess cost exists because, in the past, receivers have been more likely to respond appropriately to costly signals. For example, in models of sexual selection that assume that the female is getting ''good genes'' or ''good parental care'', there is a correlation between the quality of the male and the cost of the signal given. The correlation exists because high quality males can afford to give more costly signals, and it pays females to choose high quality males. The evolution of costly signals does not, however, require that the receiver should benefit by choosing them. For example, Arak (1988) showed that female natterjack toads, Bufo calamita, find a conspecific male by moving up a sound gradient. Given this behaviour, it pays males to call as loudly as they can: females will not necessarily benefit from mating with the loudest males, although they may in fact do so.
(iii) An index is a signal that is physically associated with a quality of interest to the receiver. For example, funnel web spiders, Agelenopsis aperta, fight over web sites (Riechert, 1978) . During fights, they signal by vibrating the web. These vibrations transmit information about weight: if the difference in weight is greater than about 10%, the smaller spider retreats. A smaller spider can be converted into a winner by attaching a weight to its back. As in the case of a cost-added signal, there is a correlation between the nature of the signal and a relevant quality of the signaller, but the correlation arises from physical necessity: it does not depend on past responses by receivers. To give a second example, Thapar (1986) reports that tigers, Panthera tigris, mark their territories by scratching as high as they can on a tree trunk: again, the signal is physically connected to size. Grafen (1990) indicate their size: it is not merely that size influences the behaviour of the receiver.
We have borrowed the term ''index'' from semiotics. Pierce (1960) distinguished between symbol, icon and index. The terms are defined by Eco (1979) as follows: ''Signs are classified as symbols (arbitrarily linked with their object), icons (similar to their object) and indices (physically connected with their object)''. Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) used the term assessment signal in the same sense as we have here used index: we prefer the latter term, because assessment signal could naturally be taken to include both cost-added signals and indices.
In the case of an index, a model of strategic choice is not needed: it is not possible for the signaller to cheat. In a model, the distinction between index and cost-added signal is clear, but in real cases the mechanism ensuring a correlation between intensity of signal and quality of signaller may not be known. In such cases, the term ''evaluation signal'' can be used to cover both possibilities.
Many displays are best thought of as indices. Courtship displays often involve one or both partners performing some athletic feat. For example, a female Drosophila subobscura will accept a male only if he keeps facing her during a side-stepping dance: old and inbred males are usually rejected (Maynard Smith, 1956 ). In such cases, the athletic ability required for the performance is necessarily correlated with the quality the female is trying to select. In the case of Drosophila, the quality is, presumably, ''good genes''. The case is even clearer when the male provides parental care, and the female demands courtship feeding. A male that feeds a female during courtship is not displaying an expensive cost-added signal, but an index of his ability to feed the young.
An example illustrating the distinction between a cost-added signal and an index is afforded by the tails of male barn swallows, Hirundo rustica (Mo ller 1995) . Female swallows prefer males with long and symmetrical tails. A long tail is a cost-added signal: it is a handicap to flight. A symmetrical tail, however, is an index: it is easier to fly with a symmetrical tail. If some males have asymmetrical tails, it is because they cannot help it. If all female choice was the strategic choice of cost-added signals, they would prefer males with highly asymmetrical tails. Table 2 shows the relation between the three types of signal discussed in this Section, and the distinction drawn in Section 3 between self-reporting and other-reporting signals. It shows that a self-reporting signal can fall into any one of the three categories, but that an other-reporting signal cannot be an index. It is not clear whether other-reporting signals can be cost-added signals. Zahavi (1993) argues that they can, in the context of cell-cell communication, as follows. Suppose that we have two cells, a signaller, A, and a receiver, B. A has an item of information, not concerned with its own state. Both A and B would benefit if B received that information. If A is certain about the information, then a minimal signal would do. But what if A is sometimes mistaken? In particular, suppose that A may be in one of two states: ''likely to be mistaken, and unable to send a costly signal''. or ''likely to be correct, and able to send a costly signal''. Then it would be evolutionarily stable for B to respond only to costly signals. Thus it is logically possible for there to be a stable otherreporting signal that is reliable because it is costly. The assumptions, however, seem implausible: why should there be an association between likelihood of being correct and ability to send a costly signal?
The Form of Signals
Do we expect the form of a signal to be related to its content? There are number of possibilities.
(i) Indices. The form of the signal is determined by the content.
(ii) Icons. The form of the signal is similar to the content. Examples include eyespots, Batesian mimics, anglerfish lures, bee orchids and the bee dance. Humans use icons because they are easy to learn and remember, and do not depend on a specific language. The animal examples suggest a different reason for the use of icons. Almost all of them involve cheating (that is, they lower the fitness of the recipient), the sole exception being the bee dance. The reason why the ''lies'' are believed is that they are relatively rare compared to the object of which the signal is a model. There are a lot more worms than angler-fish lures.
(iii) Symbols. A symbol is arbitrarily linked to its object. For example, the meanings of most words are arbitrary, although there are onomatopoeic words, and there is some functional adaptation, since common words tend to be short. Similarly, the letters of the alphabet are arbitrarily connected to their sounds. But are there any symbols in biology? Genetic codons are possible candidates, but the code has adaptive features: for example, similar codons tend to specify chemically similar amino acids, thus minimising the load caused by mutation and mistranslation. (Zahavi 1993) ; the songs of forest birds are often low-pitched whistles, which suffer less degradation than the buzzy trills of grassland birds would do (Wiley & Richards, 1978) ; many alarm notes are hard to locate, and therefore safer to give (Brown, 1982) . These ''good design'' features of signals have been referred to as ''efficacy'' (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991; Endler, 1993) . (c) Aesthetic signals. Ryan (1990) has suggested that male ornaments have the form they do because the sensory biases of females ensure that they will elicit a response. Arak & Enquist (1993) have shown that selection for recognition of signals can lead to the evolution of hidden preferences for previously unfamiliar signals. Examples of signals that evolved in this way remain elusive, since molecular phylogenies cast serious doubts on the two most convincing examples (Ryan & Rand, 1993; Meyer et al., 1994) .
Conclusions
We have suggested two distinctions that should be made when discussing the evolution of animal signals.
The first is between cost-added signals and indices. In both, there is a correlation between the intensity of the signal and the quality of the signaller. But in the case of a cost-added signal the correlation exists because, in the past, receivers have responded differently to signals of different intensity, while in the case of an index the correlation arises from physical necessity. Both types can be called evaluation signals, a term which can be used when the evolutionary causation is not clear. The second distinction is between signalling costs that are required to ensure effective transmission, and the additional costs that may be needed to protect the reliability of the signal against cheating. This leads to the distinction between minimal signals and cost-added signals.
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